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Abstract 
The world has seen a dramatic increase in cybercrime, in both the Surface Web, which is the portion of content on the 
World Wide Web that may be indexed by popular engines, and lately in the Dark Web, a portion that is not indexed by 
conventional search engines and is accessed through network overlays such as the Tor network. For instance, theft of 
online service credentials is an emerging problem, especially in the Dark Web, where the average price for someone’s 
online identity is £820. Previous research studied the modus operandi of criminals that obtain stolen account cre-
dentials through Surface Web outlets. As part of an effort to understand how the same crime unfolds in the Surface 
Web and the Dark Web, this study seeks to compare the modus operandi of criminals acting on both by leaking Gmail 
honey accounts in Dark Web outlets. The results are compared to a previous similar experiment performed in the 
Surface Web. Simulating operating activity of criminals, we posted 100 Gmail account credentials on hidden services 
on the Dark Web and monitored the activity that they attracted using a honeypot infrastructure. More specifically, 
we analysed the data generated by the two experiments to find differences in the activity observed with the aim 
of understanding how leaked credentials are used in both Web environments. We observed that different types of 
malicious activity happen on honey accounts depending on the Web environment they are released on. Our results 
can provide the research community with insights into how stolen accounts are being manipulated in the wild for 
different Web environments.
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Introduction
Online services are popular among individuals and com-
panies for personal, business, or academic purposes. 
Normally, users are required to create personal accounts 
which are protected by private credentials. A  large 
amount of sensitive data is stored within such personal 
accounts and some of them, such as webmail accounts are 
primarily used to access further services. Consequently, 
users are victims of data theft by cybercriminals stealing 
account credentials for their own benefit. According to 
the Crime Survey for England and Wales Office (2016), 
one out of ten adults has been victim of some kind of per-
sonal data theft.
Cybercriminals use social engineering techniques such 
as phishing and spear phishing (Lynch 2005), malware 
on victims’ devices (Stone-Gross et  al. 2009) and also 
exploiting vulnerabilities in authentication databases 
(Newman and Clarke 2017; Wall 2007) to steal user cre-
dentials. After obtaining the credentials, criminals can 
monetise the accounts in different ways. They seek for 
sensitive information such as credentials to other online 
services, financial information and even intimate infor-
mation that can be used to blackmail the victim. Simi-
larly, they can be used to send spam or spear phishing 
emails to other victims. Finally, credentials can be used 
as goods which are traded or shared in underground 
outlets.
Open Access
*Correspondence:  uctzdbe@ucl.ac.uk 
1 Department of Security and Crime Science, University College London, 
London, United Kingdom
Full list of author information is available at the end of the article
Page 2 of 11Bermudez Villalva et al. Crime Sci            (2018) 7:17 
It is a great challenge for researchers to determine what 
happens when an account has been compromised. Previ-
ous research focused on understanding the use of stolen 
accounts in the Surface Web, i.e., the portion of the Inter-
net where websites are indexed in the search engines and 
it is accessible with any browser. Onaolapo et  al. (2016) 
studies the activity of cybercriminals accessing compro-
mised Google accounts leaked through different outlets. 
Lazarov et al. (2016) monitors criminal activity on leaked 
Google spreadsheets. Similarly, Bernard-Jones et  al. 
(2017) investigates the effects of language on cybercrimi-
nals navigating on compromised webmail accounts.
However, at the same time, cybercriminals are becom-
ing more sophisticated and continue to improve their 
methods and techniques in order to engage in outlets of 
compromised data without getting caught or blocked. For 
instance, the increasing use of the Dark Web and the ano-
nymity that this platform provides has attracted cyber-
criminals who can commit various computer crimes and 
maintain their activities hidden from law enforcement 
agencies. The Dark Web refers to websites hosted on net-
works built on top of the Internet that are not indexed by 
conventional search engines and only accessible by spe-
cialized software such as The Onion Router (Tor) (Syver-
son et al. 1997).
The main feature of these networks is that they provide 
user privacy by obfuscating the traffic between a client 
and a website or online service; therefore, the user can 
access the hosted content anonymously   (Marin et  al. 
2016). The Tor network offers encrypted communications 
through which content providers can anonymously dis-
tribute content. These features can hamper the attempts 
of law enforcement agencies to track illegal activities and 
ultimately stop criminals who, according to some studies 
are using hidden outlets in the Dark Web to find or trade 
stolen account credentials  (Dolliver and Kenney 2016; 
Lacey and Salmon 2015). According to Top10VPN.com, 
the world’s largest Virtual Private Network review site, 
someone’s online identity is worth £820 to miscreants on 
the Dark Web as for February 2018 (Migliano 2018).
Although some research has investigated various types 
of illegal activities in the Dark Web (Dolliver and Ken-
ney 2016; Christin 2013), very few studies have compared 
how the same crime unfolds in both environments: the 
Surface Web and the Dark Web. As such, this paper aims 
to address this gap by comparing the results of the exper-
iment performed by Onaolapo et al. (2016) in the Surface 
Web with the results of a similar experiment performed 
in the Dark Web. The new experiment follows Onaolapo’s 
methodology to leak and monitor honey accounts. These 
accounts resemble legit email accounts from common 
users and are leaked through several online services on 
the Internet. Data from both experiments was collected 
and analysed to provide some insights into the differ-
ences related to stolen credentials in both environments.
To achieve this, we monitored honey webmail accounts 
leaked in the Dark Web for a period of a month using 
the infrastructure proposed by Onaolapo et  al. (2016). 
For that purpose, we created fake Gmail accounts whose 
credentials were leaked in various outlets within online 
services of the Tor network such as paste sites (online 
outlets where users can store and share plain text) and 
underground forums. The intention of the experiment is 
to make cybercriminals interact with these credentials. 
Then, all events related to the emails in the accounts are 
recorded, namely when a mail is read, favourited, sent or 
a new draft is created. Similarly, we tracked the access to 
each account in order to obtain the system information 
and the origin of the login session.
The results suggest that stolen accounts are more likely 
to receive unwanted accesses when they are leaked in the 
Dark Web, especially on paste sites. The analysis of the 
activity performed on those accounts indicates that most 
access events are from curious actors who may be test-
ing the credentials but do not perform any other activ-
ity. However, some of them repeatedly log in to the same 
account presumably to look for new relevant informa-
tion. On the other hand, highly frequent use of unknown 
browsers suggests an attempt to hide the browser dur-
ing the access. In summary, this paper makes the follow-
ing contributions:
• We studied the activity generated on 100 email 
accounts whose credentials were leaked in different 
outlets of the Dark Web.
• We compare the results of this experiment with those 
obtained with one conducted with a similar meth-
odology on the Surface Web (Onaolapo et al. 2016). 
Our results show that there are distinct differences 
between both Web environments in terms of mali-
cious activity depending on the leakage outlet.
• Using the data collected, we publish a dataset con-
taining the intrinsic characteristics of accesses to sto-
len accounts in a repository open to the public.1
Background and related work
Online accounts are valuable sources of personal infor-
mation but they also usually gain a level of trust and 
reputation over time among contacts and other online 
services. There are several methods by which cybercrimi-
nals steal accounts credentials. Lynch (2005) analyses 
1 https ://bitbu cket.org/gianl uca_stude nts/surfa ce_vs_dark_crede ntial s_datas 
et.
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phishing, where criminals send fake emails that seem to 
be official online services and make their victims type 
in their credentials on a fake site. Likewise, spear phish-
ing attacks include fraudulent emails which are aimed 
at one or a specific group of users (Stringhini and Thon-
nard 2015). Another method used is to infect users with 
malware that steals information because their devices are 
not properly prepared to counter the threat (Stone-Gross 
et  al. 2009). Finally, vulnerabilities in online databases 
can result in a massive leakage of credentials (Kontaxis 
et al. 2013). The aforementioned research describe steal-
ing techniques but do not analyse what happens when an 
account has already been compromised.
Several studies has analysed the means by which cyber-
criminals dispose the information they possess. Crimi-
nal activities have led to a digital underground economy 
(Holz et  al. 2009). The credentials of any account are 
goods that can be exchanged within this economy in sev-
eral outlets. Holt and Lampke (2010) analysed the under-
ground markets in which criminals release or trade the 
information obtained through malicious activities. In 
some cases, these accounts are freely released in order for 
the authors to build a reputation within the underground 
community (Butler et al. 2016). On the other hand, crimi-
nals seek some sort of financial gain and sell the stolen 
accounts to other criminals to monetise them. Ablon and 
Libicki (2015) argue that trading stolen data has become 
lucrative and easier to carry out than other types of ille-
gal trade. Furthermore, a growing body of research has 
shown that personal and financial data can be obtained 
through markets for stolen data at a fraction of their true 
value (Holt and Lampke 2010). Therefore, there is a huge 
exchange rate of stolen credentials in the underground 
economy which are exposed in different outlets.
As a consequence, a small but growing body of research 
has focused on the actions taken by cybercriminals when 
obtaining access to the compromised online accounts. 
They can be used to send spam (Egele et  al. 2013), find 
sensitive information or liquidate financial assets of the 
victim (Bursztein et  al. 2014). Bursztein focuses on the 
stealing of credentials through phishing. However, com-
promised credentials can be obtained on several outlets. 
Onaolapo et al. (2016) analyses the activities cybercrimi-
nals carry out on compromised Gmail accounts. This 
work, which involves creating, populating and leaking 
fake Gmail accounts on paste sites, underground forums 
or by using malware, suggests that the attackers try to 
evade Google security mechanisms by using the location 
information of the account as the source of connection, if 
this information is provided.
Onaolapo et al. (2016) provide an analysis of the inter-
action between cybercriminals and hijacked accounts 
when stolen credentials are traded in outlets within the 
Surface Web. Based on the observations obtained from 
the accesses to the honey accounts, they identified a clas-
sification of the activity carried out by cybercriminals. 
There are four types of attackers according to the actions 
that they perform within the accounts:
• Curious log into the honey accounts and perform 
no further actions in them. They simply access the 
accounts to check the correctness of the credentials.
• Gold Diggers perform searchers on the emails con-
tained in the account to find sensitive information 
that could be monetised in the underground econ-
omy.
• Spammers use the honey accounts to send spam 
messages by exploiting the trust that contacts have 
with the account owner.
• Hijackers change the account password to take full 
control of it, preventing the original owner of the 
account from having access.
Elsewhere, Stringhini et  al. (2010) created 300 honey 
profiles on three major social networks to analyse how 
spammers operate. Similarly, Lazarov et al. (2016) leaked 
Google spreadsheets to understand what criminals do 
when they obtain illegal access to cloud-based docu-
ments. Dolliver and Kenney (2016) made a comparison of 
black markets in the Tor network using statistical analysis 
to determine significant differences among intrinsic char-
acteristics of those markets.
The aforementioned research is performed on outlets 
positioned in the Surface Web which are those websites 
that  are searchable and accessible using a web search 
engine such as Google, Bing, Yahoo, etc. On the other 
hand, the Deep Web refers to websites not indexed by a 
search engine but  they can be directly accessed using a 
web address. As a part of the Deep Web, the Dark Web 
refers to websites on a darknet. Darknet is an encrypted 
network built on top of the Internet which has been 
designed specifically for anonymity and is accessible 
through specific software and tools. Examples of a Dark-
net are Tor, I2P, Freenet, DN42, etc. Therefore, the Dark 
Web contains websites whose content has been inten-
tionally concealed (Weimann 2016). These websites are 
known as hidden services.
According to some studies, since law enforcement 
agencies have improved their techniques to detect and 
catch offenders who perform illegal activities in the Sur-
face Web, black markets or underground forums based 
on the hidden services have become more prominent 
over the last few years (Marin et al. 2016). Many cyber-
criminals are migrating their operations to the Dark Web. 
For instance, Hardy and Norgaard (2016) studied data 
from black markets in order to analyse this emergent 
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ecosystem of marketplaces. Unlike our work, this 
research only focused on markets such as Silk Road.
The Dark Web poses a major challenge since the identi-
ties of the actors involved in this platform remains largely 
unknown and law enforcement agencies do not have 
enough resources to stop or deter illegal activities. These 
facts represent strong incentives for criminals to use 
them. Thus, it is important to understand the behaviour 
of criminals trading stolen credentials in the Dark Web 
outlets. As there is no sound information available about 
this issue so far, this study shall provide some insight by 
measuring the activity on stolen email accounts in terms 
of unique accesses, type of activity performed, devices 
used for the access and its duration. Hence, we define our 
research question as: Does the Web environment affect 
cybercriminal activity?
Methodology
Using the honeypot infrastructure for the Surface Web 
experiment proposed by Onaolapo et al. (2016), we con-
ducted a new experiment in the Dark Web. The aim of 
the experiment was to imitate the way of operating of 
cybercriminals releasing or trading stolen account cre-
dentials through some outlets in the Dark Web, specifi-
cally in some hidden services within the Tor network. 
The infrastructure tracked the actions performed by 
criminals who had the account credentials in their pos-
session. The results of the experiment in the Dark Web 
are paired with the results of Onaolapo’s experiment in 
the Surface Web to draw comparisons. For the sake of the 
comparison, we followed the same methodology used in 
the Surface Web experiment i.e., leaking the same num-
ber of accounts across the same type of outlets.
The first step of the experiment was the creation of 
Gmail accounts which are called honey accounts. These 
accounts resemble legitimate email accounts from com-
mon users. In the creation phase, 100 honey accounts 
were created manually on Gmail. The fictitious data to 
create the accounts was automatically generated using 
a database of random names for the accounts. All the 
accounts were populated with email messages from the 
Enron dataset to simulate a real email account belonging 
to a normal user. Enron was an energy company declared 
bankrupt in 2001 and the emails dataset from the com-
pany executives were made available to the public. This 
corpus contains a total of 517,431 messages from 150 
users (Zhou et  al. 2007). Each account received at least 
200 emails which were sent in batches before and after 
the leak for it to resemble an active user account that 
handles a lot of information. The first names, last names 
and the name ”Enron” were replaced in all the emails 
using the fictitious names.
In the next phase, the accounts were instrumented with 
scripts to monitor and register the activity of anyone vis-
iting them. The monitoring infrastructure is based on the 
incorporation of Google Apps Scripts hidden in a Google 
Sheet as a normal document within each account. Google 
Apps Script is a JavaScript cloud scripting language used 
to automate different time-based and event-based tasks 
across Google products. The scripts were used to moni-
tor all the actions over emails by scanning the emails 
to determine if an email has been read, sent, marked as 
important (Starred) or if a draft has been created.
Similarly, other scripts extracted more information 
from the ‘Device activity and notifications’ section within 
the Gmail account management dashboard from each 
account. This section uses the Google fingerprinting 
system to extract the data from the cookie generated for 
each log in to the accounts. A cookie is a small piece of 
data sent to a browser by a Web server while the user is 
browsing. Cookies are designed to be a reliable mecha-
nism for websites to remember session information or 
to record the user’s browsing activity. The cookie infor-
mation includes: cookie identifier, public IP address, 
location, login time, browser and the operating system 
of the device where the login originated from. Each 
cookie found in our dataset is considered as an unique 
access to an account. As will be explained later, leaking 
the accounts in the Dark Web does not imply that the 
accounts will be accessed through Tor. In fact, this is very 
unlike because Gmail usually block login attempts from 
Tor.
Similar to the Surface Web experiment, the outlets 
chosen for the leaks were paste sites and underground 
forums. The idea behind leaking the accounts in differ-
ent outlets is to compare malicious activity among them. 
A third type of outlet, black markets, was added to the 
Dark Web experiment for information purposes only but 
not used for the comparison as they were not used in the 
Surface Web experiment. The experiment was performed 
using 100 accounts for the leakage. They were divided 
into groups, each to be leaked on different hidden ser-
vices within Tor.
The hidden paste sites chosen were Insertor and 
Stronghold. In terms of underground forums, the 
hidden services used were: AlphaBay, Silk Road 
Forum and KickAss, where there are many threads 
regarding illegal activities, such as data theft. The selec-
tion of these sites was due to the similarity they have 
with the outlets used for the Surface Web (paste-
bin.com and pastie.org for paste sites; offen-
sivecommunity.net, bestblackhatforums.eu, 
hackforums.net and blackhatworld.com for 
underground forums) in terms of the degree of activity 
found, with many posts and messages exchanged daily by 
Page 5 of 11Bermudez Villalva et al. Crime Sci            (2018) 7:17 
members. Furthermore, the chosen sites do not have an 
account method allowing visitors to post without regis-
tration. While traffic is an important variable to consider 
in the experiment, we were unable to get statistics from 
these hidden services due to the nature of them in order 
to establish differences among the sites. We acknowledge 
the limitation and we discuss it later.
Activity on the honey accounts was recorded for a 
period of about seven months for the Surface Web and 
one month for the Dark Web, which was the period cov-
ered for our ethics approval. However, in order for the 
comparison to be homogeneous, we extracted the first 
month of observations in the Surface Web experiment. 
We chose the first month to replicate the same features 
in both environments as if the Surface Web experiment 
would have been performed for only one month to make 
sure not to introduce any statistical bias.
This paper seeks to determine whether any of the char-
acteristics of the accesses are associated with the environ-
ment they are coming from. The data gathered from both 
experiments may be useful for researchers to understand 
how attackers interact with stolen webmail accounts and 
how this malicious activity differs in the Surface Web 
and the Dark Web. Therefore, we will publicly release an 
anonymised version of the data for academic purposes.
Ethical considerations
The experiment was developed taking into account sev-
eral ethical considerations in order not to affect actual 
Gmail users. First, the default send-from address of 
the honey accounts was altered so that when an email is 
sent from any of them, it was sent to a controlled SMTP 
mail server that was set up to receive and store these 
emails without forwarding them to the intended des-
tination. The send-from address was changed using the 
settings menu within each Gmail account. This measure 
was taken to avoid abuse from cybercriminals. Similarly, 
we worked in collaboration with Google to ensure that 
accounts are suspended when they are hijacked or in case 
of problems beyond our control. In addition, the project 
was reviewed and obtained ethical approval by University 
College London.
Results
The Surface Web experiment identified 164 unique 
accesses to the accounts after the leak; on the other hand, 
1092 unique accesses to the Dark Web accounts were 
recorded in our experiment (see Table  1). It is impor-
tant to note that even though the credentials are leaked 
in Dark Web outlets, they are not always accessed from 
the Tor network. Thus, in our analysis, the Dark Web 
statistics refer to accounts which have been exposed 
but not accessed through Tor. In fact, only 378 accesses 
originated from the Tor network. In order to perform our 
statistical tests we coded the collected data into the fol-
lowing variables: cookie identifier, Web environment, IP 
address, outlet, taxonomy, login time, location browser 
and the operating system of the access.
We used a chi-square test (Agresti 1996) to determine 
whether a relationship exists between Web environment 
and outlet. The results showed that there is a signifi-
cant relationship ( χ2 = 177.587 , p < 0.001 ). While most 
accesses from the Dark Web originate from the creden-
tials leaked through paste sites, more logins in the Sur-
face Web come from underground forums. This suggest 
that the exposure of stolen credentials is higher in Dark 
Web paste sites. On the contrary, underground forums 
in the Dark Web are less accessible since as we noticed, 
a great deal of them requires an invitation or referral to 
access them.
Taxonomy of account activity
Based on our observations on the honey accounts and 
the classification or taxonomy mentioned in previous 
sections, the following accesses were identified in the 
Surface Web: 103 Curious, 39 Gold Diggers, 2 Spammers 
and 20 Hijackers. On the Dark Web we registered 812 
Curious, 227 Gold Diggers, 39 Spammers and 14 Hijack-
ers (see Table 2).
We carried out a Fisher’s Exact Test (FET) (Mehta and 
Patel 1983) to observe if there is a significant association 
between Web environment and taxonomy ( p < 0.001 , 
99% CI). In this case, we are not using a chi square test to 
find significant differences because our contingency table 
has cells with expected frequencies of less than 5, which 
violates an assumption of this test. The test revealed that 
there is a significant association between Web environ-
ment and taxonomy ( p < 0.001 , 99% CI) but a Cramer’s 
V statistic showed that the strength of the association is 
weak (V = 0.233). This result is for the overall analysis 
and a post-hoc is performed to find individual signifi-
cances. We rely on a method that yields probability val-
ues for each combination of independent category levels 
and uses a Bonferroni correction to control for type I 
error inflation (Beasley and Schumacker 1995; MacDon-
ald and Gardner 2000). The test reports the percentage 
Table 1 Unique accesses depending on the outlet
Paste sites are more likely to be used by cybercriminals in the Dark Web 
( χ2 = 177.587 , p < 0.001 ). Conversely, more logins come from underground 
forums in the Surface Web
Paste sites (%) Underground forums 
(%)
Total
Surface 51.8 48.2 164
Dark 90.8 9.2 1092
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contribution for each cell to the overall chi-square statis-
tic. We found that there is significant association between 
the Web environment and Hijackers ( p < .001 ). Hijacking 
is more likely to take place in the Surface Web (12.2%) 
compared to the Dark Web (1.3%) where this event is 
rare. Further analysis including the variable outlet (see 
Table 3) revealed that this association is significant only 
in paste sites ( p < 0.001 , 99% CI). This may be indication 
that attackers are stealthier in the Dark Web and try to 
go unnoticed without changing password in the accounts 
which in turn indicates a certain level of sophistication. 
Regarding the underground forums, the observed differ-
ences are not significant.
Device configuration of accesses
Google’s system fingerprinting was used to collect infor-
mation about devices accessing the honey accounts. 
Table  4 shows the distribution of web environment, 
operating system in each outlet where the credentials 
were leaked. There is a significant association between 
operating system and web environment when creden-
tials are obtained in paste sites ( p < 0.001 , 99% CI). How-
ever this association is weak (V = 0.198). Although most 
of the accesses originate from Windows, our post-hoc 
analysis revealed that cybercriminals are more likely to 
use Android devices when using credentials gathered in 
the Surface Web than in the Dark Web (15.3% vs. 1.1%, 
p < 0.001 ). This may be an indication of a low level of 
sophistication as users are probably using their own 
mobile devices to access the accounts. On the other hand, 
Linux is more likely to be used in the Dark Web (22.5% 
vs. 7.1%, p < 0.001 ). It is reasonable to assume that Linux 
is used by more skilled criminals which is consistent with 
the evidence that there might be a higher level of sophis-
tication in the Dark Web. In the case of underground 
forums, the observed differences are not significant.
The browser distribution is outlined in Table 5. There 
is a significant association between Web environment 
and browser ( p < .001 ). The post-hoc test shows that 
unknown browsers are more likely to be used in the Dark 
Web (60%) than in the Surface Web (39.9%) for paste sites 
( p < .001 ). While this may be an indication that criminals 
attempt to hide the browser user agent from the Google 
fingerprinting system when accessing the accounts, one 
could easily argue that any sophisticated attacker would 
use a common user agent in an effort to avoid trigger-
ing detection mechanisms when trying to log in. The 
Table 2 Unique accesses depending on the taxonomy
Hijacking is more likely to occur in the Surface Web (FET: p < 0.001)
Curious (%) Gold 
Digger 
(%)
Hijacker (%) Spammer (%) Total
Surface 62.8 23.8 12.2 1.2 164
Dark 74.4 20.8 1.3 3.6 1092
Table 3 Distribution of accesses for each outlet and taxonomy class
There are significant differences between the Surface Web and the Dark Web when credentials are leaked through paste sites and used to hijack an account (FET: 
p < 0.001)
Curious (%) Gold Digger (%) Hijacker (%) Spammer (%) Total (%) Statistics (FET)
Paste sites
 Surface 63.5 17.6 18.8 0.0 85 p < 0.001
 Dark 74.5 20.3 1.3 3.9 992
Forums
 Surface 62.0 30.4 5.1 2.5 79 p = 0.099
 Dark 73.0 26.0 1.0 0.0 100
Table 4 Distribution of accesses for each outlet and operating system
Most of the accesses originate from Windows; however, cybercriminals in paste sites are more likely to use Android devices when using credentials gathered in the 
Surface Web. On the other hand, Linux is more likely to be used in the Dark Web (FET: p < 0.001)
Android (%) Chrome OS 
(%)
iOS (%) Linux (%) Mac (%) Unknown (%) Windows (%) Statistics (FET)
Paste sites
  Surface 15.3 0.0 0.0 7.1 4.7 9.4 63.5 p < 0.000
  Dark 1.1 0.0 1.7 22.5 3.4 8.1 63.2
Forums
  Surface 0.0 1.3 0.0 8.9 1.3 0.0 88.6 p = 0.031
  Dark 7.0 0.0 2.0 7.0 5.0 1.0 78.0
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collection of further data and an analysis of the accuracy 
of Google’s fingerprinting system would be important 
to draw strong conclusions about this aspect. Similarly, 
there is a significant association between Web environ-
ment and Chrome for both outlets ( p < .001 ). The use of 
Chrome is more likely to happen in the Surface Web for 
paste sites and underground forums. Interestingly, in the 
Dark Web we got five accesses from Mozilla Thunderbird 
clients. This indicates that several attackers, such as Gold 
Diggers or Spammers, are using the functionalities of this 
email application to abuse the accounts.
Duration of the accesses
When a new access occurs in a honey account, a cookie 
identifier is generated along with the timestamp of access. 
Indeed, each cookie in the dataset has a timestamp of the 
first access and a timestamp of the last known access to 
a honey account. We used these timestamps to deter-
mine the length of access of a cookie for each unique 
access (Onaolapo et al. 2016).
Figure  1 shows the Cumulative Distribution Func-
tion (CDF) of the lengths of accesses to the accounts in 
the Surface Web and the Dark Web. Most accesses were 
short, being less than a day, meaning that most visi-
tors accessed the honey accounts only once and did not 
return. However, Dark Web accesses had a longer time 
between subsequent interactions with the accounts com-
pared to the Surface Web for all taxonomies. Approxi-
mately 30% of Dark Web Curious logins connected to 
the accounts several days after the first login and only 
less than 5% did it in the Surface Web. For Gold Diggers, 
the trend is the same (approximately 20% vs. 5%). In the 
case of Hijackers, about 10% of accesses continued tak-
ing place during this period in both Web environments. 
However, this indication may not be entirely accurate 
because it represents the length of the access until the 
cookie was hijacked. The two Spammers in the Surface 
Web sent emails in bursts for a a short period (less than 
a day). Conversely, spam in the Dark Web occurred over 
almost ten days.
Discussion
Our findings show that accounts leaked through paste 
sites received more accesses in both Web environments 
but the scale of access is much larger for paste sites in the 
Dark Web. While it is true that paste sites are more likely 
to be used to leak credentials, there is a big difference in 
the exposure of the leaks between the Surface Web and 
the Dark Web. Normally in the Surface Web, content 
related to information leakage is removed from paste sites 
by administrators monitoring the site. On the contrary, 
paste sites are not monitored in the Dark Web and leaks 
tend to be published for longer. Therefore, credentials 
leaked in paste sites in the Dark Web are more exposed 
than in the Surface Web. Regarding underground forums, 
exposure is similar to paste sites in the Surface Web. On 
the contrary, credentials are less exposed in the Dark 
Web forums because they normally require the creation 
of an account and sometimes an invitation. One limi-
tation of our work is that we were not able to establish 
whether the outlets used for our experiment are similar 
in terms of traffic. Therefore, the difference in the num-
ber of accesses between both Web environments may 
be due to the particular websites and hidden services we 
chose and not because of the environment itself.
In terms of the type of activity (taxonomy), there is a 
higher concentration of Hijackers in the Surface Web. 
Hijacking can be considered as malicious but the absence 
of it can mean that cybercriminals are more sophisti-
cated and try to go unnoticed when using credentials. 
Thus, there is a higher level of malicious activity in the 
Surface Web but miscreants tend to be more stealthy in 
the Dark Web. Interestingly, our data shows that there 
is high concentration of Curious in the Dark Web. Even 
though no activity is performed on the honey accounts, it 
is reasonable to assume that more skilled attackers would 
not interact with the accounts to avoid detection. Unfor-
tunately, we are not able to detect these ”sophisticated” 
Curious users. Furthermore, the high level of Curious 
activity in the Dark Web can be explained by sophisti-
cated miscreants crawling websites searching for stolen 
data and using bots to just perform the login in order to 
build a credentials database for further inspection.
We showed that a variety of operating systems and 
browsers were used to access the honey accounts. 
Android is more likely to be used in the Surface Web 
showing a low level of sophistication as personal devices 
may be used to log into the accounts. On the other hand, 
the use of Linux is a sign that high-skilled attackers are 
accessing the Dark Web accounts. It may be the case 
that sophisticated attackers are using Windows bots for 
accessing the accounts, yet we are not able to measure 
automatic accesses with our infrastructure.
With regards to the type of browsers used, accesses 
from unknown browsers are more likely to happen in the 
Dark Web: this fact indicates that attackers try to hide 
their browser user agent information, suggesting some 
degree of sophistication. However, the use of browser 
extensions to change or hide the browser the user agent 
is common among users nowadays. Moreover, it could 
be argued that skilled users are prone to use known or 
typical user agents as an attempt to avoid being flagged 
as malicious users. In the Surface Web, Chrome is more 
likely to be used to log in to the accounts. The use of 
this common browser suggest a low level of sophistica-
tion in this environment. Our data was collected using 
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Google’s fingerprinting system, thus the reliability of the 
results depends on the accuracy of the system. Neverthe-
less, the observed differences suggest that a considerable 
percentage of sophisticated users attempt to be stealthy 
in the Dark Web when credentials are obtained through 
paste sites. Also, the comparison shows that attackers in 
the Dark Web are more likely to connect several times to 
look for new information in the accounts.
The comparison shows us that although the differences 
in terms of the type of activity are not substantial in some 
cases, the Dark Web attracts individuals who seek to dis-
cover the secrets of the dark side of the Web. The high 
number of accesses through hidden services suggests that 
there is a great interest in the information contained in 
the Dark Web outlets. It is reasonable to assume that this 
information could lead many users to use it in a malicious 
way and end up becoming cybercriminals.
We believe that security systems for account logins 
can be improved with the help of behavioural detec-
tion systems which are capable of finding activity pat-
terns that seem to be different to those commonly used 
in the accounts. Therefore, information about accesses 
to compromised accounts can be useful in build-
ing algorithms that allow early detection of malicious 
Fig. 1 CDF of the length of unique accesses on the honey accounts for: a Curious, b Gold Diggers, c Hijackers and d Spammers. X axis represents 
the duration of the access in days. Most accesses in all categories occured only once
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activity. We observed malicious activity taking place on 
accounts leaked in the Dark Web suggesting an increas-
ing use of this environment as a platform to perform 
illegal activities, especially as far as the trade of stolen 
information is concerned. For this reason, data gath-
ered from this project may support the development of 
policies focused on disabling hidden outlets dedicated 
to those activities.
One of the important limitations of this comparison 
is that the experiment for the Surface and the Dark Web 
were performed in different spaces of time. Therefore, 
the level of activity in both Web environments could 
have changed from one experiment to the other. Thus, 
the data of the experiments may not be enough to gen-
eralize our results. Our future agenda includes setting 
up honeypot infrastructure for both environments on 
other online service to establish a more accurate com-
parison. Another limitation was the number of Gmail 
accounts that we were able to create for our experi-
ment. The creation of an account requires the registra-
tion of a phone number and any automatic approach is 
flagged as spam by Gmail; therefore, we were not able 
to create a large number of them.
Conclusion
In this paper, we compared the data from two simi-
lar experiments in which credentials of honey email 
accounts were leaked in the Surface Web and the Dark 
Web. We collected and performed a comparison based 
on different variables in our observations. Compro-
mised accounts received more unauthorised accesses 
in the Dark Web than in the Surface Web, especially 
when credentials are released in paste sites due to level 
of exposure of this type of outlet. We found that there 
is a relationship between the Web environment and 
the type of activity performed in the honey accounts as 
well as the configuration of the devices used to log in 
to the accounts. We believe that our findings can help 
the research community to get a better understanding 
of the different types of malicious activity on stolen 
accounts. This comparison will contribute to the devel-
opment of behavioural rules than can be included in 
detection systems aiming to protect users from attack-
ers in different layers of the Internet.
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